Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
1992 United States Supreme Court case / From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Dear Wikiwand AI, let's keep it short by simply answering these key questions:
Can you list the top facts and stats about Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife?
Summarize this article for a 10 year old
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), was a landmark Supreme Court of the United States decision, handed down on June 12, 1992, that heightened standing requirements under Article III of the United States Constitution. It is "one of the most influential cases in modern environmental standing jurisprudence."[1] Lily Henning of the Legal Times stated that:
- In [this] decision, hailed by the right and attacked by the left as well as by a broad swath of legal scholars, the Court made clear that plaintiffs must suffer a concrete, discernible injury—not a "conjectural or hypothetical one"—to be able to bring suit in federal court. It, in effect, made it more difficult for plaintiffs to challenge the actions of a government agency when the actions don't directly affect them.[2]
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | |
---|---|
Argued December 3, 1991 Decided June 7, 1992 | |
Full case name | Manuel Lujan, Jr., Secretary of the Interior, Petitioner v. Defenders of Wildlife, et al. |
Citations | 504 U.S. 555 (more) 112 S. Ct. 2130; 119 L. Ed. 2d 351; 60 U.S.L.W. 4495; 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3543; 34 ERC (BNA) 1785; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4985; 92 Daily Journal DAR 7876; 92 Daily Journal DAR 8967; 22 ELR 20913; 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 374 |
Case history | |
Prior | Defendant's motion to dismiss granted, Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987); reversed and remanded, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988); summary judgment granted to plaintiffs, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1988); affirmed, sub nom. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1988); cert. granted, 500 U.S. 915 (1991) |
Holding | |
Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring suit under the Endangered Species Act, because the threat of a species' extinction alone did not establish an individual and nonspeculative private injury. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Scalia (Parts I, II, III-A, IV), joined by Rehnquist, White, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas |
Plurality | Scalia (Part III-B), joined by Rehnquist, White, Thomas |
Concurrence | Kennedy (in part and in judgment), joined by Souter |
Concurrence | Stevens (in judgment) |
Dissent | Blackmun, joined by O'Connor |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. Art. III; 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (§ 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973) |
In Lujan, the Court held that a group of American wildlife conservation and other environmental organizations lacked standing to challenge regulations jointly issued by the U.S. Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce, regarding the geographic area to which a particular section of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 applied. The case arose over issues of US funding of development projects in Aswan, Egypt and Mahaweli, Sri Lanka that could harm endangered species in the affected areas. The government declared that the act did not apply to projects outside of the United States and Defenders of Wildlife sued.